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CHARLES W. FORNOFF*
I. WHY AND IN WHAT MANNER GENERAL AsSUmPSIT SURVIVES
The forms of action have been dead for over a century-long live
their terminology! Wrapped up in that terminology has been much
basic learning about pleading, causes of action, and remedies, and the
development of replacement language has been slow. Slowest has been
progress in the action of assumpsit in the division called general as-
sumpsit.
Last of the common law forms of action to appear, assumpsit was
developed by the courts to meet needs arising from the shift of English
society from medieval rigidity and relative simplicity into the free-
doms, flexibility, and complexity of modern life. Dragging along some
of the old concepts, the ancient one of debt particularly, serving as
the major vehicle for adding flexibility and complexity to relation-
ships through modern contract law, it also served as the spawning
ground in law actions for developing at a rather late date an entirely
new remedial principle, early labelled quasi-contract and now more
broadly identified as restitution. Untangling restitution from pro-
cedural language, and adjusting substantive law concepts and other
remedial ideas to its impact as it cuts through contracts and other
fields, have been slow processes, still vigorously going on.1 The lan-
guage of assumpsit has been a key to precedents old and often new,
as its terms have served as landmarks for the pleader. The purpose of
this study is to pull together the clearer Ohio precedents and the newer
concepts into a pattern useful to the pleader, as a basis for classify-
ing his cause of action and dealing with it in an appropriate fashion
at various procedural stages.
To untangle pleading rules, substantive law, and remedial prin-
ciples, Ames's historical account of the development of assumpsit is
almost indispensable.2 Only a conceptual summary is here attempted.
Being "at law" the remedy of assumpsit purported to be "damages,"
and of course a great function of special assumpsit was the recovery
of unliquidated damages for breach of contract. The simple "promise"
was in this sense "enforceable" in special assumpsit. Very early, how-
ever, "debt" was also literally enforceable in general assumpsit and
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo Law School.
1 See generally Restatement, Contracts (1932), passirn; Restatement, Restitution
(1937); Corbin, Contracts, "Damages," "Restitution," and "Specific Performance"
(1950); Symposium, "Damages in Contract," 20 Ohio St. L. J. 173-327 (1959).
2 Ames, Lectures on Legal History, chs. 12-15 (1913); Ames, "The History of
Assumpsit," 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1889).
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soon also in special assumpsit, debt being a duty to pay a liquidated
sum or sum certain of money which defendant unjustly detained.
Though the idea of promise was not part of the debt concept, a prom-
ise was "implied" out of the transaction from which it arose, not a
far stretch if it were a loan or bargain and sale, but the fiction fitted
the allegations to the form of action. Little more fictitious was the
implied promise in implied-in-fact contracts. But when the promise
was "implied in law" in various contractual and non-contractual trans-
actions, the fiction was pretty obvious and the courts felt the need to
call upon the "equitable principles" of quasi-contract to justify the
fiction. Yet an obligation to pay a sum of money founded upon law
rather than promise was not at all alien to the debt concept, so
bringing the quasi-contract or restitutional cases within general as-
sumpsit was not doing obvious violence to its remedial principle. Even
in the more ancient action of debt, the obligation enforced was often
"founded on law" being a payment required by statute or custom.
Reading the words and tracing the decisional pattern of numerous
great judges, it is clear that the basic concepts of assumpsit were the
true promise, express or implied in fact, and debt, a very simple and
basic notion of obligation. Out of the true promise came the sub-
stantive law of contracts. Out of debt, when freed of the limits of
promise, a limit threatened by association in assumpsit, came the
remedial structure of restitution. General assumpsit remained the
pleading form for enforcing all debt obligations, whether founded on
a true promise or not, and this protean simplicity after its first use-
fulness diminished has meant much groping and confusion.
Since assumpsit developed its own forms of pleading, the lan-
guage of assumpsit today is used in three different connections: (1)
as a type of pleading, particularly the highly simplified style of the
common counts; (2) as a means of identifying and defining causes of
action; and (3) to point to or distinguish the remedies of unliquidated
damages, debt, and restitution.
II. TERMINOLOGY AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
Special assumpsit "lies for the recovery of damages for the breach
of simple contract, either express or implied in fact."' In special as-
sumpsit the contract was specially pleaded and the gist of the cause
was failure to perform the alleged promise. Special assumpsit was the
necessary form where the contract remained executory, i.e., not fully
performed on plaintiff's part, or where defendant's promise was to do
an act other than the payment of money.4 On the other hand, special
3 Shipman, Common Law Pleading 148 (3d ed. 1923).
4 In Ohio, on non-performance by defendant of the promised act other than the
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assumpsit was still appropriate though plaintiff had fully performed
and defendant's unperformed duty was merely to pay a sum specified
in the contract. In the first of those two cases, the remedy was un-
liquidated damages determined by the reasonable value of the promised
performance, plus compensation for any foreseeable consequential
injuries, while in the second, plaintiff could only recover for the debt
and damages for its detention.5
General assumpsit, sometimes referred to as the common counts
in assumpsit, lay generally to enforce a duty to pay money. In the
indebitatus counts the duty enforced was debt, a sum certain fixed
by agreement of the parties or by statute or custom, while in the
quantum meruit and quantum valebant counts, the duty was to pay
plaintiff what he reasonably deserved for his services, or, what the
goods furnished were reasonably worth, the sum not having been fixed
by express agreement. In indebitatus assumpsit the usual money counts
were: money paid to the use of defendant, money had and received
to the use of plaintiff, money lent, interest due, and balance due on
account stated. Other indebitatus counts were goods sold and delivered;
land bargained and sold; work, labor and services; work, labor and
materials; use and occupation of land; board and lodging; liability
imposed by statute to pay money; and any other circumstances upon
which a debt may be founded.
From the labels of the common counts it may be noticed that if
there was a contract, it had been executed on plaintiff's side by pas-
sage to or for defendant of a quid pro quo, something of value, a fact
which was essential for raising a debt obligation except where it was
raised by grant or by obligation of law. In the earlier cases the strict
requirement of certainty of amount in pleading a debt left a clear
sphere for the quantum counts despite the fact that the duty enforced
was like that of debt except as to certainty. When the judges later
relaxed the requirement of certainty by holding that the sum due
could be made certain by the jury, the practical distinction between
the indebitatus and quantum counts disappeared with the result that
any case appropriate for the latter could also be stated in the former.
The obliteration of this line between the indebitatus and quantum
counts explains the appearance of quasi-contract cases under both
types of counts since earlier many of the claims would have lacked the
certainty of amount required for debt. Curiously, however, the the-
oretical distinction between the two is preserved in the present phrase
payment of money, the contract becomes one for money. Newman v. McGregor, 5 Ohio
349, 24 Am. Dec. 293 (1832); Dixon v. Kittle, 109 Ohio App. 257, 164 N.E.2d 806
(1959).
5 Restatement, Contracts § 326, Comment b (1932) ; Corbin, Contracts, § 995 (1950).
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that plaintiff may recover in the quantum meruit, the denotation being
that his measure will be "reasonable value" in terms of market value,
as distinguished from the agreed or contract price. This usage is fre-
quent in express contract cases when quasi-contract relief is given
instead of damages or debt.
Quasi-contract relief in assumpsit is available only in general
assumpsit, either in a count specially pleading the facts or commonly
in the common counts of money had and received, goods sold and de-
livered, perhaps money paid to the use of defendant, and in the
quantum counts. The term quasi-contract is used here frequently in
place of restitution, though with some hesitancy, because it is widely
used in the Ohio cases, its use to designate the kind and occasions for
restitutional relief available "at law" is rather common,6 and in con-
nection with pleading problems it seems appropriate to keep in mind
the difference between the bare restitutional cause of action leading to
a judgment at law and the usually more elaborate statement of facts
necessary to support an equitable form of restitution.
III. THE STYLE OR FoPm OF PLEADING IN GENERAL AsSUiPSIT
While it may have been customary at common law to plead in
general assumpsit only in the set forms of the common counts, a form
so general in essential allegations after the verbiage is eliminated,
as sometimes to be said to consist only of conclusions of law, pleading
practice under the Ohio code is more complex. Four different situa-
tions and sets of problems are reflected in the Ohio cases: (1) a
petition more or less in the common law form of common count, charac-
terized by allegations according to legal effect; (2) the statutory
short-form petition; (3) a special pleading of the cause, alleging in
some detail the facts of the transaction; and (4) a petition drawn
to plead an express contract or a tort claim, which runs into diffi-
culties because of failure of proof, statute of limitations or frauds,
various joinder or procedural problems, poor recovery prospects, or
perhaps other reasons making a switch to general assumpsit desirable.
(1) The succinctness of the common count,' condemned in some
states as inconsistent with the fact-pleading requirement of the code,
has never been held insufficient in an Ohio reported decision, or even
clearly criticised. Two cases seem to have been misread as criticism.
In Yocum v. Allen,8 appellant's brief pointed out that the pleading,
6 Restatement, Restitution, index, "Quasi Contract" (1937).
7 See Gardner's Bates, Ohio Civil Practice, Form 238.24, "Money Had and Re-
ceived," and Form 266.17, "Quantum Meruit" (1959); See F.R. Civ. P. Forms 4, 5, 6,
and 8.
8 58 Ohio St. 280, 50 N.E. 909 (1898).
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in form a money had and received count, was incomplete by failing
to allege nonpayment, and the Supreme Court also noted a failure to
allege to whose use the money was received. In spite of such de-
ficiencies, the court refused to reverse after verdict without a showing
on the whole record of prejudicial error. Nothing in the brief or
opinion suggests the need for anything more than a good common
count. In McNutt & Ross v. Kaufman,9 a very uncertainly-pleaded
count for money had and received, followed by an answer which made
a poor stab at pleading an express contract, produced the remark by
the court: "The pleadings in this case, to say the least, should not be
adopted as precedents."
While a few statements in lower court opinions may be found
that the common count may be subject to a motion to make more
certain, there is a lack of evidence that such motions are commonly
sustained. In addition to some express approval, there is much im-
plied approval by failure of the courts to discuss the common counts
when used, or even by a categorization of detailed pleading as amount-
ing to one of the common counts, without further discussion. In Mid-
dleport Woolen Mills Co. v. Titus,'0 against a specific objection to a
petition "substantially in the form" of a money had and received
count, the court declared the pleading sufficient "not because of the
sufficiency of the pleading under the former system, but for the reason
that its language is in accordance with the facts in the particular
case."" Historically, the common count is in good standing in Ohio.
(2) The statutory short form of pleading a claim on an account
or on an instrument for the unconditional payment of money12 could
strike one as anomalous in view of code emphasis on fact-pleading.
In the light of the brevity of the forms appended by the code commis-
sioners to the recommended code, it seems fair, however, to appraise
this provision as specific encouragement to concise pleading. Since
the common count was reputed to involve fictions, and perhaps also
because of the complexity of assumpsit as compared to the simplicity
the commissioners hoped for, it may be the commissioners expected
the common counts to disappear. Whatever the intent, this statutory
form does overlap the area of general assumpsit or the common counts
as was recognized by the Supreme Court in Dallas v. Furneau.13 The
court said that such a petition stated a claim "on an implied contract
for the payment of money" and was in harmony with good common
9 26 Ohio St. 127 (1875).
10 35 Ohio St. 253 (1879).
21 Id. at 257.
12 Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.32 (1953).
13 25 Ohio St. 635, 638 (1874).
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count pleading, but held the allegation as to the amount due to be a
part of the cause of action, not a mere ad damnum clause, with the
result that failure to deny the allegation constituted an admission of its
truth and thus permitted entry of judgment on default without taking
proof as to the amount due. As noted below, Ohio lawyers have found it
possible to reduce a good many claims to "an account" form, in order
to use the statutory form of pleading, but the courts have continued to
treat such petitions as involving common count pleading problems, so
far as the analysis of issues is concerned. 14
(3) Since it is obvious in pursuing Ohio citations that lawyers
frequently undertake to plead general assumpsit claims specially
rather than in common count form (i.e., have pleaded the entire trans-
action in some detail), 15 and since it is usually uncertain just why
the choice was made, it seems best to consider some major considera-
tions which should enter into the choice. If the available evidence
makes it clear that the facts and the desired recovery fit a well-known
common count, the use of the count may not only block motions and
demurrers, but it also gives the action an unmistakable characteriza-
tion, with authority generally easy to find to support the theory and
the recovery. On the other hand, if the facts of the case to be pleaded
cannot be compressed into the relatively simple legal-effect formulae
of the common counts, it may be simpler to allege the facts of the
background transaction, contractual or otherwise, which serve to raise
the debt or quasi-contractual obligation. Chiefly needed is a clear the-
ory of the recovery sought, for the facts necessary to show the cause
of action are essentially simple in nature.' 6 Resort to special pleading
may be more frequently necessary in restitution cases because of
the limited number of common counts recognized for such recovery.
If available evidence makes it uncertain what specific ground of re-
covery may be established, special pleading may definitely be ad-
visable. In the contract cases, as will be shown, the form of the plead-
ing in Ohio is nearly inconsequential. In other areas, particularly
when different aspects of the situation might serve to support differ-
ent theories of relief or measures of recovery, there may be little
choice but to set out the transaction as a whole. The old example is
the case where plaintiff may be uncertain about "goods sold and de-
livered" for the market value against the converter because "money
had and received" might be more productive if the scoundrel has sold
the goods above market by some additional knavery. Since using two
separate counts in the petition for one cause of action seems doubtful
14 See division IV, infra.
15 Corbin contends this is always proper. Corbin on Contracts § 1102.
16 See division IV, infra.
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of propriety in Ohio, 1 and combining two common counts into one
count is unheard of, special pleading, perhaps even with alternative
allegations and prayers, may be the sole possibility. A very important
consideration in many restitution cases is the fact that equitable relief
in the form of constructive trust, equitable lien or subrogation may
turn out to be of vital consequence to recovery, particularly if de-
fendant turns out to have numerous creditors. Special pleading of the
facts would be necessary if equitable relief were demanded, or ex-
pedient if the door to equity is to be kept open.
(4) Though the original pleading is framed on a clear theory of
express contract, or even of tort where unjust enrichment may be
inferred, there should be no doubt in Ohio that the theory of pleading
is not binding, 8 and if the facts pleaded or subsequently proved will
support a general assumpsit recovery, i.e., establish a duty in the
nature of debt or quasi-contract, the complaint and proof should be
held good against an objection of want of cause of action. Switching
horses by amendment, if necessary, involves no special hazards. 9
IV. "CONTRACT" RECOVERY UNDER GENERAL AssumPSIT:
DEBT FROM PERFORMANCE
As has often been said, if the contract is fully performed on
plaintiff's side and all that remains on defendant's side is the payment
of money, an indebitatus or common count will lie. To consider this
as merely an exception to the requirement of specially pleading the
special contract is misleading. Performance has changed the jural
relations of the parties by creating a debt duty on defendant and the
change eliminates plaintiff's other rights to recover. Plaintiff can no
longer ask for unliquidated damages,20 nor "rescind" to ask for
restitution on the ground of defendant's nonperformance.2' Plaintiff
can only sue to recover the debt and damages for withholding it. If
plaintiff calls his action special assumpsit, he nevertheless recovers
the debt. But anciently, indebitatus assumpsit involved pleading debt
so that form of action is certainly available, with its simplicity of
pleading.
The nature and simplicity of the debt cause of action arising
17 Weber v. Billman, 165 Ohio St. 431, 135 N.E.2d 43 (1956); Ferguson v. Gilbert,
16 Ohio St. 88 (1865); Sturges v. Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215 (1858); Womack v. Hollon,
60 Ohio L. Abs. 465, 478 (1951); Murphy v. Quigley, 11 Ohio C.C. Dec. 638, 21 Ohio
C.C.R. 313 (1900), aff'd without opinion, 65 Ohio St. 598 (1901); Boswell v. Security
Life Ins. Co., 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 364, 30 Ohio Dec. 581 (1912).
18 43 Ohio Jur. 2d, "Pleading," §§ 32, 90, 91, 92 (1960).
19 See following section.
20 McCormick, Damages § 138, at n.7 (1935).
21 Restatement, Contracts § 350 (1932).
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out of a contractual transaction are pretty clearly reflected in two
noteworthy Ohio cases. In Cincinnati v. Cameron,2 plaintiff had under-
taken in an elaborate contract with the city to construct a hospital
building. After completion plaintiff filed pleadings "general in form,"
consisting of a statutory short-form petition with a lengthy account
attached covering all items of construction, including additions and
modifications which were never authorized in writing as the contract
required, but which had been authorized orally. After reviewing the
considerable mass of facts developed in the trial, the court concluded
as to the exceedingly brief pleadings:
A petition may be so made, although there was a special contract, if
it had been fully performed, or if the additions or modifications had
been sanctioned by defendants, and in such case indebitatus as-
sumpsit would lie, or plaintiff might elect to plead specially.
The court's perception of the basic change in the cause of action is
perhaps most clearly indicated by its observation that the city's answer
had failed to tender issues on numerous points sought to be raised in
the trial or later, including general liability, particular items of the
account, want of written orders, and want of power in the board. "All
of these matters were substantial matters of defense, and should have
been pleaded. . . ."I In short, some matters vital in special assumpsit
pleading are not part of the debt cause of action.
Some of the language of the court in Railway Co. v. Gaffney 4
has reappeared in numerous Ohio discussions involving debt pleading
problems. In that case, the court felt impelled to explain why evidence
of an "implied contract," meaning a quasi-contract claim, was admis-
sible under a petition alleging an express contract:
There is, as we have shown, no generic difference between an express
contract and one implied from circumstances. The plaintiff was not
required to state the character of the evidence on which he would
rely to support the averment, that the services were rendered under
a contract with the defendant. It was therefore competent for him
to offer the circumstances under which he did the work, in support
of his averment that it was done "at the instance and request" of
the defendant.
Work having been done, the court is saying that the particulars of
the transaction, whether those of express or implied-in-fact contract
or quasi-contract, are merely "evidence" of the ultimate facts raising
the debt obligation, i.e., the receipt of a quid pro quo by defendant at
his request. When it is stripped to essentials, no other matters are
covered by the allegations of the common count.
22 33 Ohio St. 336 (1878).
23 Id. at 356, 357.
24 65 Ohio St. 104, 61 N.E. 152 (1901).
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In Gilmour, Admr. v. Cross,2' proof tending to show an express
contract was upheld under a petition in quantum meruit; in Harper v.
Miller Aviation Co.,2 with an express contract pleaded, evidence to
sustain a recovery on implied contract was upheld. In Gorey v.
Gregg,17 when objection to evidence was raised, plaintiff was per-
mitted to amend her petition from express to implied contract, the
court citing Bolsinger v. Halliday,8 where a reverse switch had been
upheld. In Price v. Cleveland Tr. Co.,29 the court upheld an amend-
ment to make the petition allege both express and implied contract.
In both the Bolsinger and Price cases, objection was raised to the
amendment as coming after the statute of limitations barred the filing
of a new cause of action, and in both the holding was that the amend-
ment introduced no new claim, the cause of action being the same as
that originally pleaded. The rulings in the foregoing cases were all
more or less clearly bolstered by language from the Gaffney case, and
it is interesting to note a similar reliance in Gebhart v. United States30
to sustain the conclusion that a mechanics' lien may be based on an
implied-in-fact contract, though not on an implied-in-law or restitu-
tional cause.
The frequent use of short-form petitions "on an account" to
recover contract debts suggests a question of how to determine what
may be included in the account. Such "accounts" have ranged from
one item, a single fee for legal services, 31 to 200 items of performance
under the building contract in Cincinnati v. Cameron.3" While ob-
viously many of the contracts have not involved proof under the shop
book rule, such discussion as was found as to what properly comes
within an account was in terms of the evidence rule. 3  Perhaps custom
has already broken down those shadowy boundaries. In any case, the
slight probability of frequent suits based on shop books, the fact that
all of the issues of special assumpsit can be raised by defensive plead-
ing,34 and the general liberality in dealing with pleadings in general
23 20 Ohio App. 127, 151 N.E. 782 (1925). Contra, Cole v. Kiner, 44 Ohio L. Abs.
407, 63 N.E.2d 839 (1945); 47 Ohio L. Abs. 568, 70 N.E.2d 119 (1946).
26 109 Ohio App. 269, 164 N.E.2d 754 (1957).
27 78 Ohio App. 367, 63 N.E.2d 680 (1945).
28 4 Ohio App. 311 (1915).
29 45 Ohio L. Abs. 606, 68 N.E.2d 133 (1944).
30 172 Ohio St. 200, 174 N.E.2d 615 (1961).
31 Herkins v. Perrin, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 328, 86 N.E.2d 472 (1949).
32 Supra note 22.
33 Ludwig Hommel & Co. v. Woodsfield, 115 Ohio St. 675, 155 N.E. 386 (1927);
Dallas v. Furneau, 25 Ohio St. 635 (1874); Krueger v. Frazier, 31 Ohio App. 28, 166
N.E. 151 (1928); McKemy v. Goodall, 1 Ohio C.C.R. 23, 25, 1 Ohio C.C. Dec. 14, 16
(1885).
34 Ludwig Hommel & Co. v. Woodsfield, 115 Ohio St. 675, 155 N.E. 386 (1927);
1962]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
assumpsit, are factors inconsistent with restrictive definitions. Cer-
tainly a great many of the debts arising from ordinary contract per-
formance seem to come within the spirit of the provision.
V. GENERAL ASsuMPSIT AS THE MEANS TO QUASI-CONTRACT RELIEF
The ambiguity of language used in classifying Ohio quasi-contract
cases has perhaps caused more wasted time in searching for them and
trouble in stating their holdings than incorrect results. Assuming
that the writer's own travail in attempting to survey the cases might
be a fair test of the need, a brief and general classification is attempted
in the following sections, aimed at making some of the clearer Ohio
precedents more readily available to the pleader.
The range of cases is from those involving total breach of a
contract by defendant, where restitution becomes an alternative to
the damages and specific performance remedies, through cases where
a contract is involved in one sense or another but the only relief may
be restitution, to cases where any contract aspects are wholly disre-
garded because some over-riding concept fixes liability on the restitu-
tional basis, and on to cases where the relations were never contractual
but where restitutional relief may be either better or essential.
Without venturing further into restitutional principles, it is es-
sential to recall that restitution as provided by general assumpsit
actions is measured in nearly all cases without regard to valuations
to be found in an agreement, but rather by the unjust enrichment
of defendant . 5 In the contract cases the measure of restitution is
commonly the value of plaintiff's performance rather than the value
of defendant's promised performance."'
Defendant's Total Breach of Contract
When defendant breaches his agreement by repudiation or per-
formance less than complete, plaintiff has the possibilities of resort to
"damages" to put him in as good a position as full performance would
have given him or a suit for specific performance. If plaintiff has
partly performed before defendant breaches the contract and if the
breach is such as to go "to the essence" of the contract, that is, to
be "total" in the language of the Restatement of Contracts,17 then a
third remedy becomes possible, that of restitution. 3 Since by the
Dykeman v. Johnson, 83 Ohio St. 126, 93 N.E. 626 (1910); Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33
Ohio St. 336 (1878); W. H. Davis Dye Co. v. Beltz-Hoover Elec. Co., 40 Ohio App. 308,
178 N.E. 418 (1931).
35 Restatement, Restitution, ch. 8, topic 2 (1937).
36 Restatement, Contracts § 347 (1932) ; Corbin, Contracts § 996 (1950).
37 See §§ 317, 326 (1950).
38 Restatement, Contracts § 347 (1932); Corbin, Contracts § 1104 (1950).
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agreement the parties have fixed the equivalency of the values to be
exchanged, defendant is estopped to deny that his failure to complete
the exchange by performance has unjustly enriched or benefitted him-
self. Thus the measure of the restitutional recovery is the value of
the performance rendered by plaintiff. Such a measure is required if
the plaintiff is to be put approximately in as good a position as he
had before the contract.
In Doolittle v. McCullough,39 the trial court gave an instruction
which allowed a restitutional recovery, saying that if defendant
terminated the contract without consent of plaintiff, the latter was
not bound by the contract price and could recover what the work
done was actually worth. The petition appeared to be a debt count
for work and labor. Declaring the instruction erroneous, the Supreme
Court discussed and approved only the contract rule of damages, i.e.,
the contract price for the portion done plus profit on the remainder
which could not be performed, and then noted that plaintiff clearly
would have lost money if he had completed performance. Some 36
years later in Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co.,40 the court
recognized restitution as an alternative to damages, declaring it well
settled "that when full performance of a contract has been prevented
by the wrongful act of the defendant, plaintiff has the right either
to sue for damages, or he may disregard the contract and
sue as upon a quantum meruit for what he has performed."', The
holding of the case is consistent with the rule stated, that is, that
plaintiff was entitled to recover at the market rate at times of delivery,
times when the market was higher than the contract price which had
been based on a full year's range of fluctuations. But the attempt of
the court to reconcile the instant case with Doolittle, a difficult thing
since the latter involved only the damage remedy and the instant case
only restitution, resulted in some confusion in syllabus and opinion.
The court fell into the trap of the factual differences of the two cases,
the proof in Doolittle strongly suggesting that plaintiff was better off
because of defendant's breach, while the reverse was clear in Wellston.
As the authorities cited in Wellston show, it is the fact of defendant's
breach, his withholding of the full agreed exchange, which determines
the fact of unjust enrichment, not the question of whether plaintiff can
prove he is worse off than if he were permitted to complete perform-
ance, or more properly, that the defendant is better off. Having tossed
the contract out of the window, defendant is in no position to recall
it for any purpose, such as to demonstrate that it was not a good con-
39 12 Ohio St. 360 (1861).
40 57 Ohio St. 182, 48 N.E. 888 (1897).
41 Id. at 185.
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tract for plaintiff anyway. The difference in effect is very important
to the enforcement of contract obligations. The evil of choosing the
wrong method for determining "unjust enrichment" is that the wrong
rule may help the defaulter go scot-free, while the correct one offers a
good chance of taking away the fruits of his wrongdoing.
In the area of service contracts, the principle of allowing recovery
upon quantum meruit, where defendant "voluntarily abandoned" the
contract and prevented full performance by plaintiff, was clearly
recognized in Ralston v. Kohl's Admr.,42 the court assuming the
valuation of the services rendered to be a proper issue. In Cleveland
Co. v. Standard Amusement Co.,43 when a contract for advertising for
a year at a reduced rate was repudiated by the purchaser, recovery
for all copy published was allowed at the much higher rate for casual
advertising, the court explicitly rejecting all reference to the express
contract as a means of limiting recovery. While the "right" of the
client to dismiss his attorney at any time has produced some unusual
decisions as to the recovery of fees agreed to in advance, apparently
a damages remedy, in cases where the fee has not been, fixed in
advance quasi-contractual recovery appears to be recognized in Bolton
v. Marshall,44 particularly by a citation of the Wellston case.
Impossibility of Performance
An analysis of the general contracts problem of when "im-
possibility" may be claimed, a matter of complexity and careful
distinctions, must precede the question of remedies.4 Many of the
decided cases, of course, involve only the question of whether im-
possibility terminates the primary duties of performance so as to bar
remedies for breach of contract, for only part performance conferring
benefits will raise a question of restitution.46
Where a party to a contract has paid in advance the agreed price
for services or goods and either part or all of the return performance
becomes impossible without fault on either side, or because of any
assumed risk on the part of the payer, unjust enrichment has occurred
and restitution should be available." It was so held in McCammon v.
Peck,4 a case in which the client had paid his attorney in advance the
42 30 Ohio St. 92 (1876).
43 103 Ohio St. 382, 133 N.E. 792 (1921).
44 153 Ohio St. 250, 91 N.E.2d 508 (1950).
45 See generally, Corbin on Contracts, ch. 74-78 (1950).
46 Id., at §§ 1367-1372; Restatement, Contracts, cl. 14 (1932).
47 Restatement, Contracts § 468 (1932).
48 9 Ohio C.C.R. 589, 6 Ohio D.D. Dec. 504, 3 Ohio Dec. 232 (1895), rev'd without
opinion, 56 Ohio St. 790 (1897), but facts and arguments, Ohio Supreme Ct. Dec. 886
(1901). Appellant's argument in the supreme court being directed at an interpretation
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full fee agreed upon and the attorney died before completing more
than a fraction of the services. The recovery was for the amount paid
less the reasonable value of the services actually performed, the court
holding the deduction necessary because if the attorney had not been
paid, his estate would have been entitled to recover the reasonable
value of partial performance in quantum meruit. The case is thus
one with a possible right of restitution on either side. A similar right
of restitution would arise in case of a contract to sell specific goods if
the buyer paid in advance, and, before the risk passed to the buyer,
the goods wholly or partially perished without the fault of either
side, a result embodied in the statutory provision that the contract is
avoided in one case and voidable in the other.49
In a road construction case in which the contract appeared to
assume the existence lof a local supply of a specified material, when
the subsequent determination was made that there was no such local
supply, it was held that the duty of performance ended and a duty
arose on the benefitted party to compensate the contractor for the
partial performance to that point on the basis of the value of the
materials furnished and labor performed. 50
Illustrative of the assumptions as to where risk of loss ought to
fall as a means of determining "impossibility" and thus the presence
or absence of restitutionary rights, are the two situations of contracts
to build a house and to make repairs or additions to an existing
structure. If the building is destroyed prior to completion of perform-
ance, only in the latter case is impossibility of completing performance
found and restitution in the form of recovery pro tanto for labor
and materials permitted. 51 Recovery in this case, however, would seem
to be limited to the contract rate.
Benefits Conferred by Plaintiff, Now in Default Under a Contract
In the earlier Ohio cases, as in a great many other jurisdictions,
the party who had partly performed his undertaking but who could
not claim substantial performance, generally went without recovery
even under quantum meruit. Personal service for an agreed term,
construction contracts, the sale of chattels and other transactions were
included. It was true, however, that a liberalizing trend was under
of the retainer contract which would eliminate the issue of impossibility, the doctrine of
the lower decision would not seem to be cast in doubt.
49 Ohio Rev. Code § 1315.09 (1953) ; Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1302.11, 1302.71 (1961).
O State ex rel. Jewett v. Sayre, 91 Ohio St. 85, 109 N.E. 636 (1914).
51 Bailey v. Brown, 6 Ohio C.C. Dec. 440, 3 Ohio Dec. 120 (1895). See, as to prob-
lems of construing the contract, Bd. of Educ. v. Townsend, 63 Ohio St. 514, 59 N.E.
223 (1900); Corbin, §§ 1369-1372. As to the measure of recovery see Restatement,
Contracts § 468(3).
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way early.52 Many of the earlier Ohio cases were reviewed in Kirk-
land v. Archbold,53 but the court concluded that such a drastic rule of
forfeiture was not in keeping with a strong trend in other jurisdictions
to the rule that the defaulting contractor may recover the reasonable
value of the work done, less whatever damage the other party has
suffered. Such relief is of course restitutional and usually pleaded
in a quantum meruit count. The numerous clashing policies to be
found in this area, and the conceptual and practical problems, have
been too thoroughly discussed recently to need comment here.54
Mutual Rescission
Not dealt with here is the "right to rescind" of the party who has
partly performed before the other's repudiation or total breach of a
contract or before the discovery of other grounds for avoiding the
contract. Speaking in terms of "rescission" by one party or by a
court of equity seems to be helpful language for demonstrating that
the contract is no longer the measure of remedial rights and also a
way of emphasizing the restitutional principle that if the complaining
party has been benefitted, he must return by his own act or by court
decree that benefit before he can get restitution. But the use of such
figurative language has been questioned as unnecessary and occa-
sionally misleading." Such cases are here classified as to basic ground
for granting restitution and without reference to the concept of rescis-
sion.
Whether mutual rescission of a contract is express or to be
implied out of the conduct of the parties, if the parties have not
expressly or impliedly agreed to an adjustment of claims arising out
of performance prior to rescission, a duty of restitution will arise
on the party unjustly enriched thereby. If a judgment for money will
suffice, a quasi-contract action will lie. It would appear that express
agreements to rescind usually do adjust performance claims for only
one Ohio case, Brown v. Johnston,56 was found involving subsequent
suit for restitution. In that case the purchaser under a land contract
had made substantial payments before default and surrender of pos-
session to the vendors who then placed a notation on the contract that
52 A leading case in the personal services field is Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481
(1834).
53 113 N.E.2d 496 (App., 1953).
54 Nordstom and Woodland, "Recovery by Building Contractor in Default," 20
Ohio St. LJ. 193 (1959); Fischer, "Rights of Recovery by a Contractor on Building
Contracts Partially or Substantially Performed," 11 U. Cin. L. Rev. 379 (1937); Corbin,
Contracts §§ 1122-1135 (1950); Restatement, Contracts § 357 (1932).
55 Corbin, Contracts § 1105 (1950).
56 95 Ohio App. 136, 108 N.E.2d 298 (1952).
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by agreement the contract was cancelled and purchasers were released
of all obligations. The principles of restitution would allow a de-
duction not only for the rental value during occupancy but also for
damages done to the premises. Approving a judgment for a partial
recovery of payments, the court noted that apparently proper de-
ductions had been made on both grounds.
More numerous are the cases in which mutual rescission is
spelled out of the conduct of the parties, either to defeat a suit for
damages for breach, 7 or as a basis for giving relief for benefits con-
ferred by part performance. In Middleport Woolen Mills Co. v.
Titus,5 " plaintiff paid defendant $10,000 at various stages of a three-
year course of dealing involving a written contract and the ultimate
frustration of the objective. Plaintiff's petition was for money had
and received, the evidence was sharply conflicting, and verdict went
for defendant. Assuming the district court had reversed the judgment
on the ground the weight of the evidence showed the parties had put
an end to the contract, the Supreme Court concluded, without feeling
the need to cite authority, that plaintiff would be entitled to recover
on his petition under those circumstances. Lewis v. White9 involved
a contract for the sale of land, a vendor who was unable to convey an
unencumbered title, and a vendee who after two weeks offered to
perform though without a tender or evidence of readiness to perform,
followed by notice that vendee rescinded. When the vendor sued for
damages for breach, the vendee cross-petitioned for the money paid on
execution of the contract. The Supreme Court directed judgment for
the vendee, declaring the vendee's good faith in offering performance
and his readiness to perform were immaterial because his consent to
rescission coupled with vendor's inability to perform for an unreason-
able time, effected a mutual rescission. In Rogers v. Simpson,6" similar
facts were involved, and the court declared that vendee's default did
"not deprive him of the right to be placed in the same position as
before the contract was made," a statement which reflects the basic
objective of restitution.
For Performance Under an Unenforceable Contract
Quasi-contractual recovery for benefits conferred by performance
by plaintiff is commonly available in transactions where the contract
57 Hall v. Hall, 32 Ohio St. 184 (1877); Mowry v. Kirk Cheever, 19 Ohio St.
375 (1869); Dickson v. Wolin, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 107 (App. 1934). See Cantor v. Cantor,
86 Ohio L. Abs. 452, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 148, 174 N.E.2d 304 (1959).
5s 35 Ohio St. 253 (1879).
59 16 Ohio St. 444 (1866).
60 11 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 561, 21 Ohio C.C. Dec. 103 (1908).
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is voidable and avoided by plea of Statute of Frauds or illegality,
though in the latter case only if policy does not forbid any relief."
To be distinguished is the unusual Ohio doctrine that part
performance under an oral contract for the sale of an interest in land,
will take the contract "out of the statute" for purposes of suits at law
as well as in equity, if the performance is strictly referrable to the
particular contract.2 In such cases, the remedy will be unliquidated
damages or debt.
An excellent opinion in Towsley v. Moore6 3 approved and care-
fully spelled out the application of the restitutional remedy to a con-
tract not to be performed within a year. Plaintiff in effect agreed to
become and remain a servant in the household of defendant until she
should reach majority, a period of over six years, and defendant
agreed then to pay plaintiff what her services should reasonably be
worth. Suing after she reached majority, plaintiff's recovery was
sustained against a plea of the Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court
declined to accept as a basis of decision the proposition that a fully
performed contract is outside the statute because such reasoning
seemed "to play fast and loose with both the contract and statute."
It was much "more intelligent" to say that though the contract is
void, the "party must pay for such advantage as he has received...."
To the argument that when there is an express contract there can be
no implied contract, the court observed that "it can hardly be a dead
letter upon one side and not on both." Insisting that the measure of
recovery was upon the promise implied by law, not upon the alleged
express terms which happened to be the same in that case, the court
quoted:
[T]he recovery is not upon the contract, but upon the quantum
meruit or valebat, or upon the money counts. It is a recovery back of
the consideration of a contract upon which no action will lie, and
which has been repudiated by the other party.
A count for money had and received in Hummel v. Hummel" was
founded on an oral agreement that if plaintiffs would pay the pre-
miums on a 15-year endowment policy on their son's life, the son and
his wife would hold the proceeds for plaintiffs. After maturity and
payment of the proceeds, quasi-contractual recovery was upheld
61 Krauskopf, "Solving Statute of Frauds Problems," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 237 (1959);
Restatement, Contracts § 355 and ch. 18.
62 Hughes v. Oberholtzer, 162 Ohio St. 330, 123 N.E.2d 393 (1954); La Bounty v.
Brumback, 126 Ohio St. 96, 184 N.E. 5 (1933); Myers v. Croswell, 45 Ohio St. 543, 15
N.E. 866 (1888); Randall v. Turner, 17 Ohio St. 262 (1867).
63 30 Ohio St. 184 (1876).
64 133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N.E.2d 923 (1938).
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against a plea of Statute of Frauds, the opinion surveying numerous
cases and authorities.
The case of Hughes v. Oberholtzer5 is perhaps most safely used
as an illustration of the difficulties of pulling together the cases and
remedial principles in this field. Alleging an oral contract, the
petition pleaded the facts specially and prayed damages for the non-
performance of three of the four items of consideration for plaintiff's
agreement to convey a tract of land. In performance of the oral
agreement, plaintiff had conveyed the land when defendant paid
$20,000, the fourth item of consideration. Plaintiff's prayer was for
approximately $6000 and otherwise it was clear that defendant's non-
performance was of substantial character. It seems impossible to
infer the precise form in which the claim was presented to the Supreme
Court except that quasi-contract recovery in some form was argued
for and also recovery at law on the ground of part performance. The
latter ground was rejected on the ground the part performance was
insufficient under the Ohio rule. The court seemed to assume that if
asked for, specific restitution of the land might be decreed in equity,
or recovery of the value of the property transferred might have been
sustained, both entirely sound under the principles of restitution, but
apparently neither was sought. A common count for lands sold and
conveyed 6 was, of course, the quasi-contractual cause of action.
Whatever the character of the quasi-contract claim made, the court's
attention was not directed to the correct ground for ascertaining the
existence of unjust enrichment, i.e., the retention of benefits from
performance after repudiating the agreement under which they were
received. The court found no unjust enrichment because plaintiff had
not shown the land conveyed to be worth more than the sum received
at that time from defendant. That basis of determining unjust enrich-
ment is just as objectionable here as in the case of repudiation or
breach of a nonvoidable contract.
Attorney fee contracts which are voidable because champertous, 67
because of client's lack of capacity to contract, 8 or because uncon-
scionable, 9 and avoided by the interposition of the defense, "relegate"
the attorney to his action on quantum meruit.
6 162 Ohio St. 33d, 123 N.E.2d 393 (1954).
66 Shipman, Common Law Pleading, 166-7 (3d ed., 1923).
67 Brown v. Bruner, 10 Ohio App. 314 (1919).
68 In re Habant, IS Ohio Op. 473, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 446 (1940).
69 American Vitrified Products Co. v. Crooks, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 627 (App., 1935),
motion to certify overruled June 12, 1935; Roberts v. Lee, 72 Ohio App. 235, 51 N.E.2d
108 (1942).
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Recovery of Benefits Conferred by Mistake
Starting with the simple case of overpayment induced by mis-
take,7" where unjust enrichment results from the mistake,71 pleading
in general assumpsit will generally be appropriate.
The question of recovering the payment of a check, the payment
having been made by mistake, has arisen in a number of cases. In an
early case,72 payment of a check by the drawee bank to a bank which
had taken the check on a forged endorsement from a stranger without
performing a local duty of checking identity, was held recoverable
under a count for money had and received, as a payment made by
mistake. Much more recently, the payment of a check issued upon
fraudulent proof of performance directly to the "creditor's" assignee
who did not stand in the position of a holder in due course, was held
recoverable as money had and received to the use of the prayer.73
Restitutionary principles were applied in a different fashion, however,
in a recent case 4 involving payment by mistake of a check by drawee
bank after the bank had received a stop payment order. It was shown
the payee of the check had a valid and subsisting claim against drawer
at the time of payment, so the court held the bank might debit the
amount on drawer's account. The court classified the bank's claim as
in general assumpsit for money paid to defendant's use, quoting the
Restatement of Restitution'in finding that the payment was property
of one person used in discharging an obligation owned by another,
under such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched
by the retention of the benefit thus conferred."'
In a many-sided case, after finding notes and a mortgage securing
them to be void because payments from the proceeds of the notes were
not made in compliance with F.H.A. regulations, it was held that pay-
ments made by the debtor on the notes before notice of the facts,
might be recovered as made under mistake.76
In a case between two municipalities,77 a petition pleading the
facts specially was upheld as stating a cause for quasi-contractual
70 Aluminum & Magnesium Inc. v. Grundstein & Sons, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 555, 148
N.E.2d 239 (1956).
71 Restatement, Contracts, ch. 17 (1932) ; Restatement, Restitution, ch. 2 (1937).
72 Ellis v. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628 (1855).
73 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cent. Nat]. Bank, 159 Ohio St. 423, 112 N.E.2d
636 (1953).
74 Centril Natl. Bk. v. International Sales Co., 87 Ohio App. 207, 91 N.E.2d 532
(1950).
75 Restatement, Restitution § 162 (1937).
76 Botzum Bros. Co. v. Brown Lumber Co., 104 Ohio App. 507, 150 N.E.2d 485
(1957).
77 Indian Hill v. Cincinnati, 153 Ohio St. 562, 93 N.E.2d 22 (1950).
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relief, apparently money had and received. An intangibles tax payer
had for several years reported his residence to be in Cincinnati though
in fact it was in Indian Hill, and the taxes had been paid by the
collector to Cincinnati. Relying on the Restatement of Restitution,
the court found a cause of action stated in favor of the municipality
to which the payment was due against the one to which the payment
was made by mistake. The court distinguished this from cases where
quasi-contractual recovery against a city is denied because failure to
meet mandatory statutory requirements would make the express con-
tract unenforceable and the policy of the statute would bar alternative
relief.
Waiving the Tort and Suing in Assumpsit
That general assumpsit may be used to give a quasi-contract
remedy as an alternative to a tort remedy has long been expressed in
the old phrase which in form refers to an election of remedies but
which may more usefully be read as referring to the advantages of
assumpsit to plaintiff in terms of the longer statute of limitations for
"contracts" not in writing,78 simpler pleading and less risk of variance,
or on occasion a more favorable measure of recovery, or even as a
means of stating an otherwise ineligible claim in bankruptcy.
In Woodward v. Suydam and Blydenburg,9 the principal's evi-
dence that the defendant factors sold below the directed minimum was
held admissible under a common count for goods sold and delivered
to recover the market value of the merchandise. The alternative tort
action would have been either trover for conversion or an action on
the case for misconduct."0 Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered was
upheld in Barker v. Cory"1 where plaintiff had delivered logs to de-
fendant to be sawed into lumber and defendant converted the lumber
to his own use. In Sparrow v. Hosack,82 the current owner of land
subject to a judgment lien filed a petition which used the words money
had and received to plaintiff's use, to recover the excess of defendant's
bid at a sale over the amount due on the judgment, an amount which
defendant had failed to pay the sheriff. Without making it clear what
the alternative action would have been, and after saying that a count
for money had and received was appropriate only when money had
been received, the court did find a "perfect statement of a cause of
78 Mount v. Lakeman, 21 Ohio St. 643 (1871); Yirchner v. Smith, 7 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 22, 28 Ohio C.C.R. 25 (1905); Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Tracy, 86 Ohio
L. Abs. 225, 176 N.E.2d 610 (1960).
79 11 Ohio 360 (1842).
80 Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N.Y. 523, 23 Amer. Rep. 184 (1877).
81 15 Ohio 9 (1846).
82 40 Ohio St. 253 (1883).
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action" in that defendant "received the equivalent of money for which
in justice and honesty he should have accounted to" plaintiff."3
Privity was not necessary, so the court observed, to maintain assump-
sit. 4 Perhaps less troublesome to classify would be such a case as
suit against the husband who had received his spouse's separate money
and could not prove it to have been a gift, 5 the person who has
failed to account for public money received, whether as an official
or otherwise, 6 or one who had sold plaintiff's property when sued in
money had and received for the proceeds.87
The fraud cases where a general assumpsit recovery has been
sought appear to have been less common in Ohio than those in which
relief was sought in equity or in replevin or conversion. An action
to recover the premiums on insurance fraudulently sold to plaintiff
was denied in one case only because plaintiff was not a party to the
contract,88 but was allowed in another.8 9 The result of "rescission" in
equity grounded on entrapment of plaintiff into a forfeiture, i.e.,
the recovery of the premiums paid,"° could have been accomplished in
general assumpsit, so the case is illustrative of the relative freedom
of choice in the area between law and equity. In a federal case in
Ohio in 1923, 91 the court did not find it necessary to decide whether
a claim for excessive charges under a complicated cost-plus contract
was in tort or in contract, but it did find an elaborate petition subject
to a motion to make definite and certain. It might well be as-
sumed that against such a complex background as that of such war-
time contracts, a common count would not be tolerated under code
principles, though the Ohio cases shed no light on the point. In a
rather complex and confused course of dealings, with at least some
mention of fraud, the court in Womack v. Hollon92 failed to make it
clear that the use of a common count was inappropriate.
Duress
Since the background from which a claim of duress arises may
be a contractual or tortious transaction or some other type of relation-
ship, the classification of duress is based only on the fact of a com-
83 Id. at 259.
84 Ibid.
85 Yocum v. Allen, 58 Ohio St. 280, 50 N.E. 909 (1898).
86 Mount v. Lakeman, 21 Ohio St. 643 (1871).
87 Kirchner v. Smith, 7 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 22, 28 Ohio C.C.R. 25 (1905).
88 U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 533 (1878).
89 Provident Savings Life Assur. Co. v. Statler, 17 Ohio C.C.R. (ns.) 59, 24 Ohio
C. Dec. 391 (1911), aff'd without opinion, 88 Ohio St. 549, 106 N.E. 1073 (1913).
9o Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pottker, 33 Ohio St. 459 (1878).
91 United States v. A. Bentley & Sons Co., 293 Fed. 229 (1923).
92 60 Ohio L. Abs. 465, 475, 102 N.E.2d 26, 33 (1951).
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pulsion of plaintiff involuntarily to confer a benefit on defendant
which amounts to an unjust enrichment.
Recovery under a count for money had and received was upheld
in Reinhard v. City,93 where after an illegal arrest the officer demanded
and accepted a deposit in cash, an illegal substitute for bail, before
he would release the prisoners. The court found the payment of the
money was involuntary, and the money being received by the city,
that it was held for plaintiff's use. The court found the principle well
stated by Greenleaf: 94
Under the count for money had and received, the plaintiff may also
recover back money proved to have been obtained from him by
duress, extortion, imposition, or taking any undue advantage of his
situation, or otherwise involuntarily and wrongfully paid ....
The voluntariness of the payment, rather than the basic form of relief,
has been the difficult issue. 5
Other Examples of Quasi-Contract Recovery
The range of general assumpsit claims based on restitutional
principles seems to be limited only by the appropriateness of a money
judgment as a remedy and by precedents making some claims cogni-
zable only in equity. Further search would no doubt uncover a con-
siderable number of other Ohio precedents. Two fields of some breadth
are mentioned as suggestive.
In the area of breach of fiduciary obligations, it was held in
Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Tr. CoY0 that allegations that
defendant shareholders, officers or directors of the corporation, had
acquired property with funds of the company and sold it for large sums
of money, diverted company funds to personal purposes, and failed to
pay interest to the company for use of company funds, stated a quasi-
contractual cause of action and thus a "contract" claim within the
terms of the attachment statute.97
In the area of recovery of compensation for discharging the legal
obligations of another, Sommers v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ.98
upheld recovery on a quasi-contractual basis by a parent who trans-
ported his child to school under circumstances making it the duty of
93 49 Ohio St. 257, 31 N.E. 35 (1892).
94 Id. at 269.
95 Union Properties, Inc. v. Cleveland, 142 Ohio St. 358, 52 N.E.2d 335 (1943);
Columbus Citizens Telep. Co. v. Columbus, 88 Ohio St. 466, 104 N.E. 534 (1913);
Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534 (1860); Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268 (1853).
96 155 Ohio St. 391, 99 N.E.2d 301 (1951).
97 Talbott, "Restitution Remedies in Contract Cases: Finding a Fiduciary or Con-
fidential Relationship to Gain Remedies," 20 Ohio St. LJ. 320 (1959).
98 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682 (1925).
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defendant to do so. The factors which kept the parent from being
a volunteer and thus being barred from recovery were discussed with
care. In this same area is Smith v. Snapp,99 wherein it was held that
when a husband leaves no estate, his widow is liable for expenses
incurred during his last illness though she did not directly contract
therefor. Basing the obligation in the statutes, one of the ancient
bases of quasi-contractual obligation, a suit upon an account was
upheld.
CONCLUSION
In the retrospect of history, one may well marvel at the genius
that went into the construction of the action of assumpsit, an edifice
founded on very simple concepts, yet adequate to provide the basis
for very great developments in substantive and remedial law. In the
division of general assumpsit there was even produced a form of
simplified pleading which has seemed quite consistent with some of
our most recent and advanced thought in that field. No brief, how-
ever, is submitted for a revival of training in the language and quid-
dities of this complex field of concepts. Since there are basic differences
between the remedies of unliquidated damages, contract debt, and
restitution, differences closely tied into the substantive law, perhaps
those terms will have to serve instead of "damages," "implied prom-
ises," and suing on "the quantum meruit." Perhaps it has been demon-
strated that in the old terminology, ambiguity was really built in.
V9 87 Ohio L. Abs. 318, 16 Ohio Op. 2d 304, 175 N.E.2d 333 (1961).
